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Microfinance Competition and Multiple Borrowing:  
Evidence using Panel Data from Bangladesh 
 





This paper examines the causes and consequences of multiple borrowing in rural Bangladesh 
using long-term household and village panel data covering the years 2000 to 2014.  Our 
empirical analysis reveals that sharply growing number of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in a 
wider set of villages over time, coincides with corresponding increase in household borrowing 
from multiple MFIs as well as households accessing loans generally. The climbing number of 
MFIs also explains the significant rises in the total values of household assets especially in the 
form of agricultural equipment. Although the increasing number of MFIs resulted in some 
households borrowing for the purposes of repaying previous loans, the fraction of such 
households is still relatively small. Overall, our results suggest that the majority of the cases of 
multiple borrowing are “healthy” or “solvent” overlapping loans that meet the large demand for 
credit for productive purposes. 
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Microcredit, small-scale loans, has emerged as one of the most powerful policy tools for 
providing financial assistance to the poor. The number of poor households with access to 
microcredit programs has increased globally, more than 18 times over the past twenty years, from 
7.6 million in 1997 to 139.9 million in 2018 (Microfinance Barometer 2019). There has been 
rapid expansion of the microfinance sector with increasing numbers of both microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) and the number of borrowers. Bangladesh has been the global center of this 
trend, witnessing rapid expansion of MFIs and their branches.1 Despite the 2006 Nobel Peace 
prize being awarded to both the Grameen Bank and its founder Professor Muhammad Yunus 
jointly, there has still been little consensus on the impact of microcredit programs. While there has 
been some discussion in literature about the positive role of microcredit on household welfare, 
including its cost effectiveness,2 recent evidence based on randomized control trials (RCTs)  
provides rather weak evidence of their positive impact (e.g. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015).  
The overall impact of improved access to credit on the welfare of borrowers ultimately 
rests on whether the microcredit programs relax the binding credit constraints on borrowers (i.e., 
mitigating credit market imperfections) or merely induce over borrowing (i.e., borrowing more 
than the borrower has the capacity to repay). It may also depend on the complementarity or 
substitutability between a loan from microfinance institutions (MFI) and other credit sources due 
to the nature of liquidity constraints, risk-sharing, borrower production functions, and 
mechanisms producing downstream outcomes (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 2015).  
Notwithstanding the fact that major MFI lenders had agreed not to work with the same 
clients, in the absence of effective credit bureaus, their rapid expansion can inevitably result in 
borrowers borrowing from multiple lenders including MFIs - a phenomenon widely known as  
 
                                            
1 The percentage of households accessing credit from MFIs (over 30 percent) as opposed to other formal 
sources in rural Bangladesh substantially increased over the past decades, reducing their dependence on 
informal lenders (e.g. money lenders, friends, and relatives). For a review of the rural credit market vis a 
vis MFI loans, see Hossain and Bayes (2018) 
2 For a review of the role of microfinance on household welfare see Khandker and Samad (2018). 
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“overlapping borrowing” or “multiple borrowing.” There is evidence of increasing competition 
among MFI lenders resulting in an increase in their presence over time (Macintosh and Wydick 
2005; Salim 2013; Sawada, Miyauchi and Yamasaki 2018). This raises the important question of 
whether intensifying competition among MFIs is a predictor of increasing overlapping 
borrowing3, and if so, what are the consequences of this on household welfare. However, to the 
best of our knowledge there has not yet been any rigorous empirical research looking into the 
causes and consequences of overlapping borrowing, and in particular, the role of competition 
between MFIs on borrowing behavior and household welfare.  
In this paper, we aim to at least partially bridge this gap in the literature by analyzing the 
effects of the increasing number of MFIs on borrowing behavior, i.e., the number and total 
amount of loans, the purpose of and use of loans, and household asset accumulation, by using four 
waves of a unique household survey and a retrospective survey on village-level information 
covering the period from 2000 to 2014. Overall, we find that an increase in the number of MFIs in 
a village predicts a higher likelihood that households will borrow from multiple MFIs and a 
higher chance of them borrowing from at least one MFI; however, there is no change in the 
likelihood of borrowing from other sources. We also find that increasing MFI competition in the 
village predicts larger household assets that are mostly used for productive purposes rather than 
only for repayment or consumption. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that combining 
small and inflexible loans from multiple MFIs serves to satisfy the high demand for borrowing for 
the purpose of purchasing productive assets.  
In the case of shared information about borrowers, between credit bureaus for example, 
multiple borrowings may be desirable for meeting the growing demand for credit.  Several 
models, however, predict negative outcomes in settings where information sharing is not 
practiced; if information on borrowers is not shared among lenders, an increase in lenders could  
 
                                            
3 In this paper, we use the terms “multiple borrowing” and “overlapping borrowing” interchangeably. 
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lead to higher default rates or a limited access to credit (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Pagano and 
Jappelli 1993; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; McIntosh and Wydick 2005).  Hence, there are reasons for 
concern about whether multiple borrowing induces over-indebtedness or insolvency among 
borrowers.4 
Generally, overlapping borrowing may happen for two opposite reasons with differing 
consequences. Firstly, a borrower may borrow from multiple sources in order to continue to make 
repayments on existing loans. This repayment cycle could potentially violate a non-Ponzi game 
(NPG) condition and lead to over-indebtedness and insolvency, thus prolonging a so-called “debt 
trap.”  Alternatively, an MFI client who has a growing productive project, may not find a single 
inflexible loan from an MFI enough to meet their needs. Similarly, an MFI’s specialization in a 
particular type of credit may not fully support financing of such a project.  Again, a client may 
need to borrow additional funds from other sources in order to cope with any unexpected events. 
These factors, especially increased demand for investment financing that cannot be met by a 
single inflexible MFI loan, may lead to borrowing from multiple sources (Karlan and Appel 
2011). 5  According to Mallick (2012), while moneylender interest rates increase with MFI 
coverage, borrowers turn to moneylenders for additional funds not only to meet seasonal capital 
investment demand but also to comply with the tight repayment schedules that MFIs set. In 
contrast, Berg, Emran, and Shilpi (2020) show that MFIs draw better borrowers away from the 
moneylenders, although competition between MFIs does not reduce moneylender interest rates. 
Using program-level data from Bangladesh, Khandker, Koolwal, and Badruddoza (2013) show 
that increased borrowing among households resulting from competition between MFIs has not 
necessarily lowered recovery rates.   
 
 
                                            
4 There is some evidence that the mere presence of “overlapping borrowing” does not necessarily 
generate over-indebtedness (Khandker, Faruqee, and Samad 2013; Faruqee and Khalily 2011). 
5 There is some support for this view in the case of Bangladesh (Khalily and Faridi 2011; Osmani, 
Khalily and Hasan 2016; Sawada, Tanaka and Mahmud 2018). 
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In relation to countries other than Bangladesh, Vogelgsang (2003) analyzes repayment 
determinants for loans in the case MFIs in Bolivia and finds that overlapping borrowers are more 
likely to default than others, although overall repayment performance has improved amid 
increased MFI competition. McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005) document rising 
competition among microfinance lenders in Uganda that led to a decline in repayment 
performance. Using experimental findings from Guatemala, de Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet 
(2010) discuss the importance of credit bureaus being present in order to address the potential 
challenges of overlapping borrowing, whereby credit bureaus generated large efficiency gains for 
lenders and also rewarded good borrowers.  Additionally, in a randomized field experiment in 
Malawi, Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2012) found that while fingerprinting during loan applications 
led to substantially higher repayment rates among borrowers with the highest ex-ante default risk, 
it had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. These latter two studies indicate the importance of 
information sharing and proper screening of potential borrowers.  Notably, even in the absence 
of credit bureaus or strict credit screening, expansion of MFI loans is not necessarily associated 
with overlapping borrowing (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 sets out the data. This is 
followed by a description of our empirical strategy in Section 3 and the results of our analysis in 
Section 4. The final section makes the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Data 
In this paper, we combine two datasets: The first dataset comes from panel household surveys 
carried out in Bangladesh (the Livelihood System of Rural Households Panel Data) that randomly 
sampled 62 nationally-representative villages and surveyed randomly sampled households within 
these villages in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014.6 The sample is nationally representative as shown  
                                            
6 The original household panel data collection was led by Dr. Mahabub Hossain (late). The repeat 
surveys were conducted during 2000–2001 by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). The same 
households were revisited in 2004 and 2008 for the purposes of poverty mapping in Bangladesh and 
assessing the impact of the rise in food prices on rural livelihoods.  The latest wave of data collection 
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by the comparison of the estimates of variables for which data are available from official statistics 
(Hossain and Bayes 2009).  For the benchmark survey carried out in 1988, a multi-stage random 
sampling method was used for the sample selection of 62 villages in 57 districts (out of 64 
districts in Bangladesh). In each wave, the household survey asked households to list all loans 
taken in the previous year, and for each loan, to note down the types of lender7, and the amount 
and purpose of the loan.  The survey also elicited the amount of household asset holdings by 
types of asset. In the unbalanced panel data, we observe 1883 households in 2000, 1861 
households in 2004, 1832 households in 2008 and finally 1703 households in 2014. Since our data 
does not allow us to identify individual borrowers within the household, we define multiple 
borrowing at the household level. We maintain the assumption of a unitary household model 
where multiple borrowing is well defined at the household level. The second dataset comes from 
our own 2014 survey of key informants in the 62 villages, which retrospectively asked about 
village characteristics including the number of MFIs, banks, retail shops, and electrification 
conditions in the past 14 years.  
 
 Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of relevant variables derived from the two 
datasets. We observe that rural households in Bangladesh intensively utilize microcredit facilities. 
Moreover, over the years there has been an increase in the number of households that borrow from 
multiple sources (defining multiple borrowing households). For the purpose of comparison, we 
define four different types of multiple borrowing: whether the household is taking loans from 
more than one source (multiple borrowing); whether the loans are from more than one MFI 
(multiple borrowing from MFIs); at least one loan has been taken from an MFI and another from 
a non-MFI (multiple borrowing from MFI and non-MFI); and, more than one loan from a 
                                                                                                                                
was made by BRAC Research and Evaluation Division in 2014-15. The household data consists of four 
waves of a household survey: 1883 observations in 2000, 2036 observations in 2004, 2011 observations 
in 2008, and finally 2846 observations in 2014. 
7 For the types of lenders, the respondents were asked to choose from Grameen bank, ASA, BRAC, 
Proshika, other NGOs, agricultural banks, other banks, money lenders, businessman, share-cropping land 
owner, or relative. 
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non-MFI source (multiple borrowing from non-MFIs). As shown in the table, on average (pooling 
four waves of the data) multiple borrowing from MFIs represents the highest share (7%), 
followed by multiple borrowing (11%). Looking across the survey years, the share of multiple 
borrowing from MFIs increased over the years. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of 
loans that a household borrowed from any lender. We observe that the number of loans from any 
source has increased over the years; in particular, the fraction of households having multiple 
(more than one) loans increased every year between 2000 and 2014.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (N=7269) 
        
 Variable  Pooling year: 2000,2004, 2008, 2014  2000 2004 2008 2014 
 Mean  SD Median  Min Max  Mean by Year 
Number of MFIs in the village 3.78 1.36 4 0 7 
 
3.16 3.61 4.08 4.34 
Number of banks in the village 0.33 1.03 0 0 5 
 
0.22 0.32 0.38 0.39 
Number of retail shops in the village 18 30 5 0 150 
 
10.92 14.58 18.77 28.72 
Access to electricity in the village (dummy) 0.80 0.40 1 0 1 
 
0.63 0.76 0.83 0.99 
Household size 5.42 2.70 5 1 34 
 
5.25 5.29 5.41 5.77 
Number of active loans 0.61 0.89 0 0 12 
 
0.45 0.49 0.60 0.94 
Borrowing (dummy) 0.44 0.50 0 0 1 
 
0.36 0.41 0.47 0.54 
Borrowing from an MFI (dummy) 0.29 0.45 0 0 1  0.19 0.22 0.36 0.41 
Borrowing from a bank (dummy) 0.07 0.26 0 0 1  0.08 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Borrowing from an informal lender (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0 0 1  0.12 0.10 0.09 0.17 
Multiple borrowing (dummy) 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
 
0.07 0.06 0.10 0.23 
Multiple borrowing from multiple MFIs (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
 
0.02 0.02 0.07 0.16 
Multiple borrowing from an MFI and a bank (dummy) 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Multiple borrowing from an MFI and an informal lender (dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 0 1  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 
Multiple borrowing from multiple non-MFIs (dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 
 
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Asset (Tk) 29073 97930 7670 0 3009000 
 
28158 26699 28566 33248 
Total amount of active loans (Tk) 15638 158372 0 0 12500000 
 
5051 5696 12605 41625 
Total amount of active loans from MFIs 6269 26469 0 0 1030000 
 
1263 1868 4715 18354 
Total amount of active loans from banks 4607 152259 0 0 12500000 
 
2171 1852 2643 12469 
Total amount of active loans from informal lenders 4763 32684 0 0 3009000 
 
1617 1976 5246 10803 
Asset: livestock or poultry (Tk) 9471 18104 1000 0 400000 
 
8035 9368 18132 1808 
Asset: business capital (Tk) 14354 80355 0 0 2100570 
 
15320 12890 3944 26154 
Asset: agricultural equipment (Tk) 5248 28449 400 0 1500100 
 
4802 4441 6490 5286 
Asset: land (hectare) 0.00 0.004 8E-04 0 0 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Borrowing for agriculture (dummy) 0.179 0.383 0 0 1 
 
0.124 0.181 0.175 0.242 
Borrowing for business (dummy) 0.122 0.327 0 0 1 
 
0.112 0.120 0.105 0.155 
Borrowing for consumption (dummy) 0.098 0.297 0 0 1 
 
0.090 0.067 0.109 0.130 
Borrowing for paying back previous loans (dummy) 0.020 0.140 0 0 1 
 
0.013 0.005 0.016 0.048 
Borrowing for other purposes (dummy) 0.072 0.259 0 0 1  0.047 0.052 0.100 0.093 
Multiple borrowing for agriculture/business (dummy) 0.060 0.238 0 0 1  0.032 0.033 0.051 0.132 
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Figure 1: Number of Loans 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of the number of loans that a household borrowed from any 
lender. Source: BISD 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014.  
 
 
From Table 1, we also find that in the surveyed villages, the average number of MFIs, 
banks, retail shops, and access to electricity has been on an increasing trend over time. While 
the average number of active loans is still less than 1, this has increased over the years from 
0.45 to 0.94. The total amount of active loans has also been on the rise over the years. Looking 
across borrowing sources, the amount of active loans from all sources increased over time, but 
the rate of increase is larger for loans from MFIs than those from other sources. With regards to 
the purposes for which borrowing was undertaken, on average the share of households 
borrowing for agriculture remains the highest (around 18% on average). While the share of 
households borrowing for repayment has increased over the years, the average share across 
years is only 2%, and the highest share was 4.8% in 2014. Interestingly, the share of households 
borrowing multiple loans for business and/or agriculture increased rapidly from 3% in 2000 to 
13% in 2014. 
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                   Figure 2: Distribution of the Number of MFIs in the Village 
 
Notes: This figure shows histograms of the number of active MFIs in a village by year, using 
village-year level data from a retrospective survey of the 62 villages in the BIDS data. 
 
 
As observed in Table 1, loans from formal sources (MFIs or other financial institutions) 
account for most incidences of multiple borrowing, and the rise in multiple borrowing appears 
to be largely attributed to multiple borrowing from MFIs. It is likely that the increase in 
multiple borrowing results from penetration of new MFIs into the villages. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the number of MFIs offering credit in the sampled villages over the years, clearly 
highlighting the increase over time. We next look into the relationship between the increasing 
number of MFIs and household borrowing behavior, first in descriptive figures and later by 
regression analysis.  
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The presence of many MFI lenders in a village is associated with the higher likelihood 
of borrowing and multiple-borrowing. The dotted points in Figure 3 show the fractions of 
households that borrow from at least one MFI (round dots) and at least one non-MFI (triangle 
dots) by the number of MFIs active in a village. Similarly, Figure 4 shows the shares of 
households that borrow from multiple MFIs (round dots) and multiple non-MFIs (triangle dots) 
by the number of MFIs active in a village. As expected, the share of households borrowing from 
an MFI and multiple MFIs clearly increases with the number of MFIs in a village. The linear 
fitted lines also confirm this relationship.  
 
Figure 3: Number of MFIs and Borrowing  
 
Notes: The horizontal axis relates to the number of MFIs in the village. The vertical axis shows the 
fraction of households who borrowed at least one loan from an MFI (round dot) or a non-MFI source 
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Figure 4: Number of MFIs and Multiple Borrowing  
 
Notes: The horizontal axis is the number of MFIs in the village. The vertical axis shows the fraction of 
households who took out at least two loans from MFIs (round dot) or at least two loans from non-MFI 
sources (triangular dot). Source: BISD 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014, combined with the retrospective 
village survey. 
 
However, when the number of MFIs increased, the households did not borrow more 
from other sources at the same time. Figure 3 implies that improved access to MFIs did not 
result in additional borrowing from informal or bank sources. This also suggests that increases 
in the number of MFIs do not seem to be driven by unobserved factors that affect demand for 
loans, which should also influence the likelihood of taking loans from other sources.  As 
shown in Figure 4, in a village with many MFIs, more households borrow from multiple MFIs; 
however, households in these villages are not more likely to take out multiple loans from 
informal lenders. Again, this evidence supports the hypothesis that increases in MFI borrowing 
and multiple borrowing are solely induced by an increase in MFIs.  
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Figure 5: Purpose of Borrowing  
 
Notes: This graph shows the percentage of the number of loans for each purpose among entire number 
of loans taken by the households in the BISD data in each year. “Consumption” includes food, housing, 
education, health, and social events.  
 
We further look at the changes in purposes of borrowing over this period of increasing 
multiple borrowing. Figure 5 shows the percentage of the number of loans taken out for each 
purpose from the entire number of loans taken by households for each year of the survey.8 
Overall, we observe that the share of loans taken out to pay back previous loans has slightly 
increased, although the total remained at a low level in 2014. We also observe that loans taken 
out for the purposes of business and agriculture have increased in recent years, while the 
number of loans taken out for the purpose of consumption has decreased.  
 
                                            
8 As we define multiple borrowing as borrowing from multiple lenders in the previous year, it is quite 
possible that these additional loans were made to pay back previous loans that were also listed in 
household data for the year. 
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3. Empirical Strategy  
In order to investigate the relationship between the presence of MFIs in the villages and 
household borrowing behavior and outcomes, we adopt a linear regression approach with 
village or household fixed effects. In the baseline specifications, we control for village fixed 
effects but also provide robustness analysis controlling for household fixed effects (in the 
Appendix) showing that the qualitative results are the same. Broadly speaking, the focus of our 
analysis is to explore how household borrowing behavior, asset holdings, and the purposes of 
borrowing are associated with the number of MFIs in the village.  
In particular, we postulate the following linear regression model:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (1)  
 
where Yit is household i’s outcome measure related to borrowing and assets, NMFIjt is 
the number of MFIs9 in a village j. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables including the number of 
other financial institutions (e.g. banks), the number of retail shops, and an indicator of 
electrification in the village and the household size. 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 represent village and year fixed 
effects, by which we control for unobserved fixed characteristics of the villages and unobserved 
time-specific shocks common across the villages (e.g. inflation rates). 
 
4. Empirical Results  
We begin by examining the relationship between the presence of MFIs and household 
borrowing. Table 2 shows the results of regressing borrowing outcomes, such as number of 
loans, overall borrowing, and multiple borrowing, on the number of MFIs in the village, 
controlling for village fixed effects and other control variables as in equation (1) (for the results  
controlling for household fixed effects, see Table A1-A2 in the Appendix). In panel A, we find 
that the number of loans per household increases with the number of MFIs in the village. The 
                                            
9 In our analysis, Grameen Bank is categorized as an MFI rather than a special bank. 
 
 
   
15 
 
likelihood of borrowing from any source is also positively and statistically significantly 
associated with the number of MFIs in the village. According to the results in columns 3-5, this 
is explained by borrowing from MFIs but not by borrowing from banks and informal sources 
such as traditional money lenders, relatives, and friends.  
Columns 1 and 2 of panel B show that multiple borrowing (taking loans from more 
than one source) as well as multiple borrowing from MFIs (taking loans from more than one 
MFI) are also positively and statistically significantly associated with the number of MFIs in 
the village. The magnitudes of the coefficients are sizable. In particular, the results imply that 
the addition of one MFI in a village is associated with a 2.6 percentage points increase in the 
likelihood of household multiple borrowing from MFIs. This is sizeable given that 7% of the 
households in our sample borrow from multiple MFIs.  
In contrast, as shown in columns 3-5, the likelihood of borrowing from an MFI and a 
bank, from an MFI and an informal lender, or from multiple non-MFIs (including banks and 
informal lenders) is not associated with the number of MFIs in a village. This result can be 
explained if additional borrowing from an MFI does not induce households to take additional 
loans from other sources such as informal money lenders or relatives. These are also consistent 
with a hypothesis that unobserved shocks to the villages are not driving either the entry of MFIs 
into these villages or general demand for loans.  
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Table 2: Borrowing behavior 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






No. MFIs 0.070*** 0.031** 0.027*** -0.001 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
      
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
 
Panel B 
















No. MFIs 0.027*** 0.026*** -0.001 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household size, 
village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Data: 
2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively denote the statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level.  
 
 
Table 3: Total Amount of Loans 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log(1+Total Loan) Log (1+MFI Loan) 
Log(1+Bank  
Loan) 
Log (1+Informal  
Loan) 
No. MFIs 0.325*** 0.305*** -0.0142 0.0601 
 (0.116) (0.0899) (0.0522) (0.0728) 
     
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household size, 
village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The outcome variables are defined by Log (variable + 1). 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Data: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, 
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Table 3 shows the results of regressing the total amount of loans by source on the 
number of MFIs.10 The coefficient for the log of the total asset is positive and significant as in 
column 1. Overall, the results are consistent with the earlier findings. An increase in the number 
of MFIs is positively and statistically associated with an increasing total amount of loans, 
particularly the total amount from MFIs, and only weakly insignificantly associated with total 
amount of loans from other sources – banks and informal sources. The results imply that an 
additional MFI in a village is associated with an average increase of 32.5% of a household’s 
total loans, mainly though MFI financing.   
Table 4 shows the results of regressing the value of household assets on the number of 
MFIs in the village.11 The results suggest that households with an increasing number of MFIs 
in the villages are accumulating more assets, in particular assets in the form of agricultural 
equipment.12 The magnitude is substantial; one additional MFI in a village increases total 
assets and the value of agricultural equipment by 12.9% and 22.9%, respectively.   
 
Table 4: Asset 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






No. MFIs 0.129* 0.122 0.113 0.229** 
 (0.0669) (0.0742) (0.0912) (0.101) 
     
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household size, 
village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The outcome variables are defined by Log (variable + 1). 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Data: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, 
** and * respectively denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level.  
 
                                            
10 Since the distribution of loan amounts is highly skewed with sparse right tail and large outliers, we 
take the log of the value after adding 1 for the baseline specification. We find that using inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation does not change the qualitative results (results are shown in Appendix 
Table 3). 
11 Since the distributions of asset values are also skewed, we use the log of asset after adding 1. Again, 
using inverse hyperbolic sine transformation provides similar results (results are shown in Appendix 
Table 4). 
12 It may be noted that such non-land fixed asset works as capital to generating more income. For 
example, Hossain and Bayes (2018) show that agricultural capital (equipment) significantly contributed 
(in addition to factors such as remittance and other non-agricultural sources) to household income over 
the years 1988 to 2014. 
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We also investigate the relationship between the number of MFIs and the purpose for 
household borrowing.  In Table 5, the dependent variables in columns 1-4 are binary variables 
which take one if a household took out at least one loan for a purpose related to agriculture, 
business, consumption, or repayment of a previous loan. While the coefficients are positive for 
all purposes, only the coefficient for borrowing for repayment is statistically significant. The 
size of the coefficient (0.008) is small in level but non-negligible compared to the mean of the 
dependent variable (0.02).  
Column 6 shows the results for an indicator of borrowing multiple loans (from any 
sources) for the purpose of business and/or agriculture. The coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. The result implies that an additional MFI in a village is associated 
with a 1.5 percentage points increase in the share of households borrowing more than one loan 
for business and/or agriculture, which is also sizable relative to the mean of this variable (0.06).  
Although the percentage of households borrowing for repayment of other debts is only 
2% of the sample, the findings relating to increasing borrowing for repayment may nonetheless 
be alarming. Therefore, we lastly explore the characteristics of those households who borrow 
for repayment. In Table 6, we show a comparison between households who have borrowed for 
repayment at any stage and those who have never borrowed for the purposes of repayment but 
have borrowed during the years of the study in terms of some of the descriptive characteristics 
of households presented earlier in Table 1. We find that “those who have borrowed for 
repayment of a previous loan at any time”, exhibited higher borrowing behavior on average in 
terms of the number of active loans, borrowing, multiple borrowing, multiple borrowing from 
MFIs, multiple borrowing from non-MFIs, and the total amount of active loans from MFIs. 
This group of households had on average less assets and lower income compared to the 
majority of other households. This group also tends to be located in regions near to Dhaka, the 
capital.  
 
   
19 
 
Table 5: Purpose of borrowing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












MFIs 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.008*** 0.009 0.015* 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) 
       
Village 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: Dependent variables in columns 1-5 take 1 if the household has a loan for the specified purpose, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column 6  
takes 1 if the household borrows from multiple sources for the purpose of either agriculture or business or both. All regressions control for electrification, 
number of banks, number of shops, household size, village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
Data: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level.  
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Table 6: Comparison of households by borrowing for repayment 
 
 Sample A 
(Never borrowed for 
repayment, but have  
borrowed during the study 
years) 
Sample B 
(Has borrowed for 
repayment) 
Difference (B-A)  





Number of active loans 0.74 5142 1.18 549 0.45 0.07*** 
Borrowing (dummy) 0.55 5142 0.68 549 0.12 0.02*** 
Multiple borrowing (dummy) 0.13 5142 0.27 549 0.15 0.02*** 
Multiple borrowing from multiple MFIs (dummy) 0.07 5142 0.18 549 0.11 0.02*** 
Multiple borrowing from an MFI and a non-MFI (dummy) 0.04 5142 0.10 549 0.06 0.01*** 
Multiple borrowing from multiple non-MFIs (dummy) 0.03 5142 0.06 549 0.03 0.01** 
Total amount of active loans (Tk) 19730 5142 22266 549 2536 4,273 
Total amount of active loans from MFIs 7349 5142 14170 549 6822 2,144*** 
Total amount of active loans from banks 6355 5142 1476 549 -4879 3,123 
Total amount of active loans from informal lenders 6026 5142 6619 549 593 1,493 
Asset (Tk) 30534 5142 18743 549 -11791 2,920*** 
Fraction of educated household members 0.60 5103 0.57 549 -0.04 0.02* 
Household size 5.90 5142 6.43 549 0.53 0.40 
Income 40835 5142 32748 549 -8087 3,905** 
Distance to Dhaka (km) 211.34 5065 195.28 549 -16.06 8.33* 
Notes: Sample A relates to households that have borrowed but never for the purpose of repayment during the years of the study, namely 2000, 2004, 
2008, and 2014. Sample B represents households that have at some stage borrowed for repayment during the study years. In both samples, data in 
years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014 is pooled. The standard error of the mean difference is estimated by using the sample of borrowers and regressing  
the variable on an indicator variable for sample B, clustering standard errors at household level. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively denote 
the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level.  
 




With rapid expansion of the microcredit sector, MFI lenders have increased their presence in 
rural areas as a way of achieving sustainability in the face of competition. While the expansion 
of MFI’s portfolios has provided financial services to a larger number of borrowers, the 
increasing competition among them also resulted in overlapping borrowing by households in 
many countries, including Bangladesh.  Using  unique panel data from Bangladesh, we find 
that in villages where the number of MFIs increased during the period 2000-2014, the share of 
households borrowing from multiple MFIs increased more than the in other villages. We do not 
find such differential trends across villages for borrowing from other sources (banks and 
informal lenders). We also find that an increase in the number of MFIs in a village predicts a 
higher availability of credit used for productive purposes, suggesting effective selection of 
high-return borrowers by MFIs. We also find that there is a significant relationship between the 
number of MFIs in a village and improved welfare in the form of higher agricultural and total 
assets.  Overall, the average features of MFI competition and borrowing appear to suggest that 
MFI competition results in an increase in “healthy or solvent overlapping borrowing”, whereas 
small and inflexible loans from multiple MFIs seem to satisfy large borrowing demand for 
productive purposes. However, our results also indicate a small but significant increase in 
borrowing for the purpose of repaying previous loans in those villages where the number of 
MFIs is increasing. Although the share of such borrowers was still relatively small, this result is 
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Appendix. Table 1: Number of Loans. Household Fixed Effects 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






No. MFIs 0.071*** 0.032** 0.028** -0.002 0.009 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) 
      
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
 
Panel B 

















0.027*** 0.027*** -0.001 0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
      
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household size, 
household fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Data: 
2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively denote the statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level.  
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Appendix. Table 2: Number of Loans. Household and Village Fixed Effects 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






No. MFIs 0.071*** 0.032** 0.029*** -0.002 0.009 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) 
      
Household 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
 
Panel B 

















0.027*** 0.027*** -0.001 0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
      
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household size, 
household fixed effects, household fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
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No. MFIs 0.347*** 0.324*** -0.0147 0.0659 
 (0.124) (0.0962) (0.0561) (0.0776) 
     
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
 
Notes: All regressions control for electrification, number of banks, number of shops, household 
size, village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The outcome variables are defined by the 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the original variable. Standard errors are clustered at 
the village level. Data: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively 




Appendix. Table 4: Asset (Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










No. MFIs 0.134* 0.124 0.123 0.255** 
 (0.0705) (0.0791) (0.0975) (0.110) 
     
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,263 7,263 7,263 7,263 
 
Notes: All regressions include village fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. The outcome variables are defined by the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation of the original variable. Standard errors are clustered at village level. Data: 2000, 
2004, 2008, and 2014. Superscripts ***, ** and * respectively denote the statistical significance at 
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